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CONFRONTING THE FICTIONS OF THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT: Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,
104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
When you sue the government ... you must falsely pretend ... that the
suit is not against the government but that it is against an officer. You may get
relief against the sovereign if, but only if, you falsely pretend that you are not
asking for relief against the sovereign. The judges often will falsely pretend
that they are not giving you relief agaifist the sovereign, even though you know
and they know, and they know that you know, that the relief is against the
sovereign. I
Fiction and illogic mark the eleventh amendment's barrier to citizens'
suits against state governments. The eleventh amendments mandate that
federal courts respect states' sovereignty2 conflicts with the fourteenth
amendment's mandate that states respect the federal rights of their citizens.3
Instead of resolving this conflict, the Supreme Court has used fictions to
avoid it.4
In particular, the Court has relied on the fictions produced by the decision
of Ex Parte Young. 5 In Ex Parte Young, the Court ruled that a suit against a
state official to enjoin enforcement of an unconstitutional state statute is not
a suit against the state. 6 The doctrine of Ex Parte Young frustrates careful
1. Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 435,
435 (1962).
2. The eleventh amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
Even though the amendment by its terms applies only to suits brought by private citizens against
states other than their own, the courts have construed the eleventh amendment to bar suits against a state
by its own citizens. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
3. The fourteenth amendment provides in part:
... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. See 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4232, at
363-66 (1978) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]; CULLISON, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Case of the White Knight's Green Whiskers, 5 Hous. L. REv. 1, 24-27 (1967) (the Court's struggle
between its interpretation of the eleventh amendment to restrict federal judicial power and its desire to
redress governmental wrongs has produced the fictions of the eleventh amendment); Duker, Mr. Justice
Rufus W. Peckham and the Case of Ex Parte Young: Lochnerizing Munn v. Illinois, 1980 B.Y.U. L. Rv.
539, 544-46 (1980).
5. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
6. Id. at 160; see infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
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analysis by the courts of the conflicting interests of (1) the states, which
must allocate their limited resources among the many needs of their
citizens, (2) the federal judiciary, which is bound to vindicate citizens'
federal rights, and (3) citizen plaintiffs, who demand redress for their
injuries.
Justice Powell's majority opinion in Pennhurst State School and Hospital
v. Halderman7 takes a large step toward eliminating the fictions that
confuse eleventh amendment doctrine. The Pennhurst Court abandoned the
fiction that prospective injunctive relief ordered against state officials does
not affect the state. 8 The Court also abandoned the fiction that suits against
state officers whose conduct is dictated by state policy are not suits against
the state itself.9 After abandoning these fictions, the Court ruled that the
doctrine of state-law pendent jurisdiction cannot override the bar of the
eleventh amendment. 10
The Pennhurst Court's re-evaluation of eleventh amendment doctrine did
not go far enough, however. The Court failed to resolve the conflict between
the eleventh and fourteenth amendments." The Court also failed to advance
a coherent characterization of the eleventh amendment. 12 Instead, the Court
ultimately reaffirmed the Ex Parte Young fictions.
This Note encourages lower federal courts to abandon the fictions of Ex
Parte Young completely. 13 The Note begins by exploring the history of the
fictions of eleventh amendment doctrine. The Note then examines the
7. 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
8. Id. at 910-11; see infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
9. Id. at 911-12; see infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
10. Id. at 919. The doctrine of state-law pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made device that allows a
federal court to entertain state claims that otherwise would be outside the court's jurisdiction. The
doctrine is necessary for federal courts to function effectively; without the doctrine, plaintiffs with both
federal-law and state-law claims would in effect be forced into the state forum to obtain full relief. See
generally 13B C. WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 3567 (2d ed. 1984). The doctrine first appeared early in the
nineteenth centrury. Id. The modem form was established in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715 (1966), where the Court ruled that federal courts possess the judicial power to entertain federal and
state claims arising from a "common nucleus of operative fact," if the plaintiff's claims are such that
"he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceding." Id. at 725.
11. See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
13. This Note's discussion is limited to the use of the fictions of Ex Parte Young after the Pennhurst
decision. For discussion of other issues raised by the Pennhurst decision, see Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The
Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REv. 61 (1984) (eleventh amendment
doctrine is based on faulty reasoning); Note, Constitutional Law-Pendent Jurisdiction v. Eleventh
Amendment: Dismissed for Failure to State a Claim upon Which Relief Can Be Granted, 18 CPEIGHTON
L. REV. 75 (1984-85) (Pennhurst decision raises unanswered procedural questions); Comment, Consti-
tutional Law: State Sovereign Immunity Reaffirmed in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,
24 WASHBURN L.J. 152 (1984) (Pennhurst decision prevents pendent jurisdiction from providing an
exception to the eleventh amendment's bar).
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Confronting the Fictions of the Eleventh Amendment
Pennhurst Court's step forward in scorning these fictions and acknowledg-
ing that suits against state officers implicate state sovereignty. The Note next
discusses the dilemma created by the Court's ruling that the eleventh
amendment constitutionally prohibits federal judicial infringement of state
sovereignty while at the same time acknowledging that the doctrine of Ex
Parte Young allows such judicial infringement. Finally, the Note proposes
that federal courts rely on 42 U.S.C. section 198314 as congressional
authorization to entertain citizens' challenges to state officials' actions. The
Note also proposes that courts recognize states' eleventh amendment immu-
nities as limited defenses to the section 1983 cause of action.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has not precisely resolved the nature of the states'
defense of eleventh amendment immunity. 15 Those who favor protecting
state autonomy tend to argue that the defense is jurisdictional. 16 Those who
favor protecting judicial power tend to argue that it is substantive, however,
and subject to judicial abrogation.17 The fiction that suits to enjoin state
officials' conduct do not implicate state sovereignty has allowed courts to
control state action without resolving the issue. 18 Yet this uncertainty
regarding the nature of the eleventh amendment defense has produced so
many inconsistencies within the case law that the doctrine cries out for
reform. 19
A. The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereignty: Confusion Begins
The dilemma of eleventh amendment doctrine begins with the United
States Constitution. At the time the Constitution was drafted, American
courts honored the British doctrine of sovereign immunity, and states
14. (1982); see infra note 121.
15. 13 WRIGHT, supra note 4 § 3524, at 167 (2d ed. 1984); see infra notes 26-29 and accompanying
text.
16. Justice Rehnquist, for example, is an advocate of constitutionally protecting state autonomy and
has characterized the eleventh amendment as a jurisdictional defense. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 678 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.); see also Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and
Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317, 1343 (1982) (eleventh amendmeat doctrinal developments are central to
Justice Rehnquist's attempts to constitutionally protect state autonomy).
17. See, e.g., Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U.
CoLO. L. REv. 1, 60-62 (1972) (state immunity doctrine frustrates courts' ability to redress governmen-
tal wrongs; constitutional basis for protecing a state from suit by its own citizens should be discarded).
18. See infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
409
Washington Law Review Vol. 60:407, 1985
enjoyed immunity from private suit in their own courts. 20 However, article
III's grant of judicial power to the federal courts included ambiguous
language that suggested that states were subject to private suit in federal
court.
2 1
In the 1793 decision of Chisholm v. Georgia,22 the Supreme Court held
that article III's grant of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction abrogated
Georgia's sovereign immunity.23 Reaction to the decision was swift. Within
two years Congress adopted the eleventh amendment to overrule the deci-
sion,24 and within five years the amendment was ratified. 25
Scholars disagree as to the effect of the eleventh amendment on article
III's grant of jurisdiction. 26 Some argue that the eleventh amendment
20. The doctrine of sovereign immunity originated in feudal England, where landowners main-
tained their own courts. These lords could forbid-or consent to-suits against themselves in their own
courts, but were subject to suit in courts of superior sovereigns. Engdahl, supra note 17, at 2-3; Jaffe,
Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1963). The
king, at the apex of the system, was immune to all suits to which he did not consent. Engdahl, supra note
17, at 2-3; Jaffe, supra at 2-3. In medieval times the mechanism of the "petition of right" developed,
however, whereby the king routinely consented to suit. Engdahl, supra note 17, at 3; Jaffe, supra, at 5-9.
American courts adopted the concept of sovereign immunity without the accompanying doctrine of the
petition of right. Jaffe, supra, at 18-19.
21. The text of article III, § 2 provides in part that:
The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
laws of the United States . . . [and] between a State and citizens of another State . . . .
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
The language of the article does not reveal whether immunities to judicial power limit its grant of
jurisdiction. See C. JAcoBs, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 19-21 (1972); Field,
The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines (Pt. 1), 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 521
(1977). The use of the word "between" to describe the grant ofjurisdiction with respect to controversies
arising between states and citizens of other states suggests that jurisdiction exists regardless of the status
of the state as party plaintiff or party defendant. Apparently even the members of the committee that
drafted the provision did not agree whether the provision abrogated the common law doctrine of
sovereign immunity. C. JACOBS, supra, at 17-19.
22. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
23. Id. at 479-80. The justices delivered their opinions seriatim. Four justices concurred in the
judgment. Justices Blair and Cushing, in relatively brief opinions, emphasized a literal reading of article
III. Id. at 450-53 (Blair, J.); id. at 466-69 (Cushing, J.). Justice Wilson authored an eloquent exposition
endorsing a strongly nationalist constitutional policy Id. at 453-66 (Wilson, J.). Chief Justice Jay
argued that state suability is not inconsistent with state sovereignty. Id. at 469-79 (Jay, C.J.). The one
dissenting justice argued that regardless of the effect of article III, the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not
authorize federal courts to abrogate state immunity. Id. at 436-37 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
24. C. JACOBS, supra note 21, at 64-67; 13 WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 3507, at 30 n. 14 (2d ed. 1984)
(eleventh amendment, adopted to overrule Chisholm v. Georgia, is one of only five amendments
adopted by Congress to overturn Supreme Court rulings).
25. Commentators attribute the states' swift approval of the amendment to their desire to protect
themselves from out-of-state creditors attempting to collect on the states' many outstanding debts. See,
e.g., Cullison, supra note 4, at 7-8, 14-15; see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 406
(1821) (purpose of eleventh amendment is to protect states from debt liability).
26. The effect intended by the framers of the amendment is virtually impossible to determine. The
congressional debates accompanying the amendment's adoption were not recorded, and no contempo-
rary indication of its intended scope exists. C. JACOBS, supra note 21, at 64-72; Field, supra note 21, at
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represents ajurisdictional bar to the assertion ofjudicial power over states.27
Most modem scholars argue, however, that the eleventh amendment merely
asserts that the substantive common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity
survived the adoption of article rn. 28 These scholars insist that since states'
immunity under the eleventh amendment is not a constitutional limit of
federal court jurisdiction, the immunity is subject to judicial abrogation. A
third characterization is that the amendment provides states a constitutional
right that is analogous to individual constitutional rights.2 9
Eleventh amendment case law reflects the controversy over the nature of
the eleventh amendment's bar. The defense is jurisdictional, for example, to
the extent that it can be raised on the appellate level. 30 Yet other aspects of
the doctrine are inconsistent with a jurisdictional defense. The amendment
541.
27. The traditional theory is that the eleventh amendment reasserted the "original understanding"
that article III's grant of power was limited by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., M. IRISH &
J. PROTmRO, TIE PoLmcs OF AmRICAN DEMOCRACY 123 (1959) (stylistic error probably produced the
clause interpreted by Chisholm v. Georgia Court to abrogate state immunity); Mathis, The Eleventh
Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation, 2 GA. L. REv. 207, 230 (1968) (supporters of eleventh
amendment intended to end all suits against states). Two modem scholars also advocate that the
amendment constitutionally limits the federal judiciary. See Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power
to Create Causes ofAction Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth
Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1442 (1975) (eleventh amendment constitutionally limits
courts, but not Congress); Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regula-
tion: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REv. 682, 693
(1976) (same).
28. See C. JACoBs, supra note 21, at 163 (eleventh amendment not intended to constitutionalize the
doctrine of sovereign immunity); Cullison, supra note 4, at 35 (impact of eleventh amendment should be
confined to cases in which state law is enforced; any further federal recognition of sovereign immunity
should be recognized as subject to judicial abrogation); Field, supra note 21, at 39; Field, The Eleventh
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines (pt. 2), 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1203, 1205 (1978)
[hereinafter Field, pt. 2] (history of amendments adoption does not compel conclusion that sovereign
immunity is constitutionally imposed); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign
Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889, 2004 (1983) (amendment should be narrowly
construed, although federal judiciary is free to develop a federal doctrine of state sovereign immunity).
See also Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an
Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv.
1033, 1108 (1983) (eleventh amendment does not constitutionally impose sovereign immunity; other
provisions of Constitution may, however, encompass sovereign immunity).
Justice Brennan adheres to the view that the eleventh amendment does not impose a constitutional
immunity that protects a state from suit in federal court by its own citizens. See, e.g., Employees of the
Dept. of Public Health and Welfare v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 299, 310
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also has relied on common-law principles of sovereign
immunity in controversies arising under the eleventh amendment. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 930 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (doctrine of sovereign
immunity is critical to the analysis of any eleventh amendment problem).
29. See Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. COLO. L. REv. 139,163-65 (1977).
30. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974) ("the Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently
partakes of the nature of ajurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial court"). But see Patsy
v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 516 n.19 (1982) (amendment is not jurisdictional in the
sense that it must be raised and considered by the Supreme Court on its own motion).
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bars suits against a state by its own citizens even though the language of the
amendment addresses only suits by a citizen of another state.31 Even though
neither states nor individuals may enlarge the federal courts' jurisdiction by
consenting to suit, a state may waive its eleventh amendment immunity32 or
consent to suit in federal court.33 Likewise, even though Congress may not
enlarge the federal courts' jurisdiction beyond its constitutional parameters,
Congress may, pursuant to the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, authorize federal courts to award money damages against state
officials. 34
B. The Fourteenth Amendment and State Sovereignty: Fictions
Introduced
The effect of the eleventh amendment on article III's grant of federal
question jurisdiction was not immediately significant. When the amend-
ment was ratified, the Constitution provided few, if any, private causes of
action against states. 35 The impact of the amendment became controversial
a century later, however, when the Civil War Amendments 36 and accom-
panying legislation37 imposed obligations on the states in favor of private
individuals.38
31. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1890) (state cannot be sued even if case is one arising
under the constitution or laws of the United States; immunity to suit is inherent in the sovereign).
32. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 390-91 (1894) (waiver of eleventh
amendment immunity found in state statute); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883) (waiver of eleventh
amendment immunity found in state's voluntary appearance in federal court).
33. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Alabama State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (state consented
to suit in federal court by commencing operation of a railroad after enactment of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act).
34. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The Court has not yet resolved the debate among
lower courts over whether Congress can limit state immunity under other constitutional provisions. See
generally 13 WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 3524, at 179-81 nn. 103-04 (2d ed. 1984) and cases cited therein.
35. See Fletcher, supra note 28, at 1071-78 (potential liability of states under the new federal
constitution was not clearly established by the framers).
36. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIII (ratified 1865; abolished slavery); id. amend. XIV (ratified 1868;
designed to guarantee former slaves the privileges of citizenship); id. amend. XV (ratified 1870;
prohibited the use of racial criteria to limit the voting privilege). The most significant provision is the
fourteenth amendment; see supra note 3 for its text.
37. Act of April 9,1866, ch. 31,14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 1982,1988-1989
(1982)) (outlawing Southern Black Codes); Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C §§ 1971, 1988-1991(1982)) (protecting voting rights); Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch.
99, 16 Stat. 433 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 9 (1982)) (protecting voting rights); Act of April
20, 1871, ch.22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985-86 (1982)) (suppressing the
Ku Klux Klan); Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (repealed 1948) (prohibiting racial
discrimination in public accommodations).
38. The 42d Congress intended that the federal courts would enforce the new obligations that the
amendments imposed upon the states. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239-40 (1972) (in post-Civil
War era "the role of the Federal Government as a guarantor of basic federal rights against state power
Confronting the Fictions of the Eleventh Amendment
In the seminal case of Ex Parte Young, 39 the Court avoided the clash
between eleventh amendment doctrine and the Civil War Amendments by
relying on the legal fiction of personal official liability.40 The Supreme
Court ruled that, in spite of the eleventh amendment, a federal court could
enjoin the state attorney general of Minnesota from enforcing a state statute
against railroads when that statute violated the fourteenth amendment.41
The Court reasoned that because the state statute was unconstitutional it was
"void," and thus did not impart any state immunity to the officer.42 Since
the state could not legally authorize the attorney general's action, he was
"stripped of his official representative character and [was] subjected to the
consequences of his official conduct." 43
The ExParte Young decision introduced at least two fictions into eleventh
amendment law. First, the decision established that state officials' conduct
can constitute state action for the purpose of providing fourteenth amend-
ment jurisdiction. This jurisdiction can exist even when the conduct is
considered individual conduct for the purpose of avoiding the eleventh
was clearly established. . . .Section 1983 [the enabling statute of the fourteenth amendment] opened
the federal courts to private citizens"). See also Developments in the Law, Section 1983 andFederalism,
90 HARV. L. REv. 1133, 1141-42 (1977) (with adoption of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth
amendments, and five major civil rights acts, the federal government committed itself to protecting
citizens against states) [hereinafter cited as Development in the Law].
39. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Commentators have called the ExParte Young decision one of the three
most important Supreme Court decisions. WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 4231, at 352 ("Ex Parte Young
established the power of the federal courts to enforce the constitution agajnt state legislative and
executive action"); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,664 (1974) (the holding of ExParte Young
"has permitted the Civil War Amendments. . .to serve as a sword, rather than merely as a shield, for
those whom they were designed to protect").
40. The doctrine of personal official liability, or ultra vires, originated in England as a means to
challenge government action. Engdahl, supra note 17, at 4. In the nineteenth century, American courts
developed a doctrine of personal officer liability that was harsh on officials. Id. at 19-20. Officials could
be liable personally for acts (1) not authorized-in-fact, and (2) authorized-in-fact, but not authorized in
contemplation of law. The second category included "positive torts," such as trespass, acts performed
under an order that a superior was not authorized to give, unconstitutional acts, and acts performed
under an unconstitutional order or statute. Id. at 17-18. Officials, therefore, bore the risk of acting under
illegal orders. Id. at 18.
Chief Justice Marshall was the first to use principles of officers' personal liability to avoid the eleventh
amendments bar. See Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 797 (1824) (elevenh
amendments limit of jurisdiction is limited to suits in which a state is named as party of record). See
generally Engdahl, supra note 17,at 20.
The Ex Parte Young Court used the ultra vires doctrine to avoid ruling on the question of whether the
later enactment of the Civil War Amendments limited the scope of the eleventh amendment to the extent
necessary to effect the purposes of those amendments. 209 U.S. at 150. The Supreme Court has
continued to avoid this issue. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 695 n.2 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
41. ExParte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 160.
Washington Law Review Vol. 60:407, 1985
amendment's bar to jurisdiction. 44 Second, the decision rested on the fiction
that an injunction against officers in their representative capacities does not
affect the state, even though the effect is to hinder the state's ability to
enforce its laws. 45 These fictions have outlasted the ultra vires theory of the
decision.46
C. Eleventh Amendment Doctrine Today
Today, federal courts will entertain a private party's challenge of state
government officials' conduct only if the plaintiff alleges (1) unconstitu-
tional conduct, or (2) conduct that is outside an official's statutory authority
and is therefore ultra vires. 47 Federal courts rarely rely upon the latter prong
of the test in suits against state officials. 48 Instead, courts generally rely
upon asserted violations of the fourteenth amendment to extend jurisdiction
under Ex Parte Young. 49
Even when a plaintiff can prove unconstitutional conduct, federal courts
will not entertain a claim against an official that is really against a state.50
44. The Supreme Court ratified this principle in Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles,
227 U.S. 278 (1913). The Court held that a federal court cannot refuse to assert jurisdiction over a
fourteenth amendment challenge to a municipal ordinance on the grounds that the highest court of the
state has not considered whether the ordinance violates the state constitution. Id. at 283-84. The Court
reasoned that an official's action can be "state action" for purposes of the fourteenth amendment even if
contrary to local law. Id. at 285-86.
45. In contexts other than eleventh amendment case law, a suit against an officer in his or her
representative capacity is considered a suit against the government itself. See, e.g., Monell v. Depart-
ment of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978).
46. Engdahl, supra note 17, at 69 n.335 (the broad ultra vires principles of which Ex Parte Young
was but one application are no longer law.)
47. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). The Larson Court
refocused the ultra vires doctrine by ruling that a government's immunity bars all suits against officers
except those for conduct that is (1) not authorized-in-fact, or (2) that is unconstitutional. 337 U.S. at
689-90. Cf supra note 40 (under nineteenth century principles, conduct authorized-in-fact but not
authorized in contemplation of law could also be ultra vires). Government immunity therefore protects
an officer for tortious but authorized acts, or for incorrect decisions as to law or fact, as long as the officer
making the decision is empowered to do so. 337 U.S. at 695.
48. In one decision, the Supreme Court did authorize a federal court's assertion ofjurisdiction over
a state official solely on the basis of allegations that the official's conduct exceeded the scope of his
authority. Scully v. Bird, 209 U.S. 481 (1908).
Justice Stevens has tried to revive use of the ultra vires doctrine to authorize suits against state
officials. See, e.g., Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 691-97 (1982)
(Stevens, J., writing for plurality) (in spite of the eleventh amendment, and in the absence of allegations
of conduct contrary to the fourteenth amendment, a federal court can order seizure of artifacts in the
possession of state officials for purposes of an in rem admiralty jurisdiction action when the officials
obtained possession of those artifats under a state law pre-empted by federal statute); Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 47 U.S. 445, 458-59 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (majority does not need to rely upon
congressional abrogation of eleventh amendment immunity to hold officials liable since majority
determined state statute to be invalid under federal legislation, officers' conduct was ultra vires).
49. Mathis, supra note 27, at 239.
50. See generally 13 WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 148 (2d ed. 1984).
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(Of course, it is often a fiction that the claim is not really against the state in
the first instance. 51) Generally, courts scrutinize the nature of the relief
sought to determine whether the state is the real party in interest.52 Suits are
barred, for example, when plaintiffs seek to impose damages liability that
will require compensation from state funds.53 In Edelman v. Jordan,54 the
Court ruled that the eleventh amendment also bars suits in equity for
retroactive monetary relief.55
The Edelman Court did note, however, that states can have imposed upon
them costs "ancillary" to an order of compliance. 56 Subsequent decisions
have established that federal courts can require that states allocate substan-
tial funds to support court-ordered injunctive relief.57
II. THE PENNHURST COURT'S DECISION
In 1974 Teri Halderman, a resident of Pennsylvania's Pennhurst State
School and Hospital, initiated a class action suit against the institution and
various state and county officials.58 The plaintiffs claimed that the condi-
tions at Pennhurst violated rights provided by the eighth and fourteenth
amendments, 59 two federal statutes, 60 and a Pennsylvania state statute.6'
The district court ruled for the plaintiffs on almost all issues, and concluded
that the plaintiffs possessed a right to habilitation in the least restrictive
environment possible.62 The district court ordered Pennsylvania to close
Pennhurst, and place its residents in smaller, less restrictive group homes. 63
51. See supra notes 44-46 and acompanying text.
52. See 13 WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 148 & n.7 (2d ed. 1984) and cases cited therein.
53. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
54. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
55. Id. at 660.
56. Id. at 668-78.
57. The Court has affirmed some quite intrusive awards against state officials as "ancillary" to
orders for prospective injuncitve relief See, e.g., Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 346-49 (1979)
(federal court's order that state notify plaintiff class members of administrative procedures available for
recovering improperly withheld federal benefits properly viewed as "ancillary" to injunction requiring
future compliance with federal regulations); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,289-90 (1977) (federal
court's order that state bear one-half of cost of remedial education programs is permissible as an order
requiring prospective compliance by state officials).
58. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 903-04 (1984).
59. Id. at 904.
60. The plaintiffs claimed relief under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1982), and under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6001-6081 (1982). Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. at 904-05.
61. The plaintiffs relied on the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966
[hereinafter cited as MH/MR Act], PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1984).
Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. at 904-05.
62. The district court found violations of both constitutional provisions, the state act, and § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act. Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. at 904-05.
63. Id.
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The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision64 on the basis of
Pennsylvania's Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act (MH/MR Act)
alone. 65 The court reasoned that federal courts should rely on state law when
possible, and that this policy mandated reliance on the state act. 66 The court
also reasoned that Supreme Court precedent allowed courts to rely on state-
law grounds to order injunctive relief against state officials despite the
eleventh amendment. 67
A five-member majority of the Supreme Court reversed the Third Cir-
cuit's decision. 68 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, stated that the
doctrine of Ex Parte Young does not authorize suits against state officials
who are alleged to have violated state law. 69 The Court held that the eleventh
amendment bars federal court adjudication of all pendent state-law claims
against state officials. 70
The Court first rejected the argument that the eleventh amendment does
not bar prospective injunctive relief ordered on the basis of state law. 71 The
fictions of Ex Parte Young, the Court noted, have been tolerated only
because they are necessary for federal courts to satisfy their obligation to
vindicate federal law. 72 The Supreme Court stated that Edelman v. Jordan73
64. 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982), rev'd and remanded, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984). The Third Circuit's
decision was its second affirmation of the district court's decision. In 1979 the Third Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision, with some modifications of the order, on the basis of the "bill of rights"
provision of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6010(1982).
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 612 F.2d 84 (3rd Cir. 1979), rev'd and remanded, 451
U.S. 1 (1981). The Supreme Court reversed the 1979 Third Circuit decision, ruling that 42 U.S.C.
§ 6010 does not provide substantive rights. The Court remanded for a determination of whether the
district court's order could be supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, or alternative provisions of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 31 (1981).
65. The MH/MR Act establishes a comprehensive program for the care of the mentally ill and
mentally retarded. Among other provisions, the Act allocates responsibilities between the state (PA.
STAT. ANN., tit. 50, §§ 4201-4203) and its counties (id. §§ 4301-05), and provides guidelines for the
admission (id. §§ 4401-19) and care (id. §§ 4421-26) of the mentally disabled. In ruling that the MH/
MR Act supported the district court's award, the Third Circuit relied on a Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decision, In Re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A.2d 631 (1981), that construed the Act to require the state to
provide the least restrictive environment possible for institutionalized mentally disabled individuals.
Penhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 673 F.2d 647, 651 (3d Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct.
900 (1984).
66. 673 F2d at 658.
67. Id. (relying on Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909)).
68. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984). Chief Justice Burger and
Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, and White joined Justice Powell's majority opinion. Justices Blackmun,
Brennan, and Marshall joined Justice Stevens' dissent. Justice Brennan also filed a separate dissent.
69. Id. at 911.
70. Id. at 919.
71. Id. at 910-11.
72. Id.
73. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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represents an accommodation of that need to vindicate federal rights to the
need to protect state sovereignty.74 The Court rejected the view that
Edelman teaches that injunctive relief does not impact state sovereignty.75
The Pennhurst Court instead ruled that, because federal court decisions of
state law claims do not vindicate federal rights, pendent state-law claims do
not qualify for Ex Parte Young's exception to the barrier of the eleventh
amendment. 76 Moreover, the Court noted, a federal court's order that state
officials conform their conduct to state law is especially intrusive into state
sovereignty.77
The Court also rejected the dissent's theory that because the defendants'
conduct failed to achieve the purposes of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act, they
acted ultra vires and, under the Ex Parte Young doctrine, were subject to
injunction by a federal court.78 The Court noted that the Pennsylvania
legislature's inadequate funding caused the defendants' failure to satisfy the
MH/MR Act's requirements. 79 The Court apparently concluded that the
ultra vires doctrine can operate to avoid the eleventh amendments bar only
(1) when necessary to vindicate federal rights, and (2) when an official acts
without any authority whatsoever.80
The Court asserted that eleventh amendment doctrine addresses concerns
of federalism; 81 the doctrine dictates where, not whether, a state may be
sued. 82 The Court characterized the eleventh amendment as a constitutional
deprivation of federal judicial power over claims against states. 83 This
jurisdictional bar cannot be displaced, the Court ruled, by the judge-made
doctrine of state-law pendent jurisdiction. 84 In response to arguments that
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction satisfies policies of convenience, judi-
cial economy, and fairness to litigants, the Court noted that a constitutional
bar to jurisdiction cannot fall to considerations of policy 85
Justice Stevens vigorously dissented. By abandoning previous reliance
on the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity, he argued, the Court
disregarded the holdings of at least twenty-eight decisions. 86 Justice Stevens
74. 104 S. CL at 910-11.
75. Id. at 910-11, 915 n.25.
76. Id. at 911.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 911-17.
79. Id. at 912.
80. Id. at 916 n.25.
81. Id. at 907-08.
82. Id. at 907.
83. Id. at 918-19.
84. Id. at 919-20.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 943 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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insisted that the Court ignored the pivotal point of Ex Parte Young, that suits
to enjoin officials' ultra vires conduct do not constitute suits against the
state.87
Justice Stevens interpreted the federal ultra vires doctrine differently
from the majority. He reasoned that the defendant officials' conduct was
ultra vires because it failed to satisfy the obligations established by Pennsyl-
vania's MH/MR Act. 88 The law provided the defendants no discretion, he
argued, to disregard their duties with respect to the institutionalization of
the mentally disabled.89 Because the state sovereign did not authorize the
conduct of the defendants, he concluded, the Court should not have ruled
that state immunity shielded the officials from the federal court's injunc-
tion.90
Justice Brennan wrote a brief separate dissent to reassert his view that the
eleventh amendment bars only those federal court suits against states that
are brought by citizens of another state.91
III. ANALYSIS OF THE PENNHURST DECISION
A. One Step Forward: Some Fictions Abandoned
In 1965 Professor Jaffe advocated that federal courts abandon "fruitless
and unhistorical attempts to determine whether a suit is 'really' against the
state."'92 The Pennhurst decision heeds Professor Jaffe's cry in two ways.
First, the Court held that the eleventh amendment barred the injunction
ordered against the Pennhurst officials.93 This holding acknowledges that
even prospective injunctive relief ordered against state officials interferes
with a state's sovereignty and is therefore "really" against the state.94
Second, the Court's rejection of Justice Stevens' ultra vires theory
acknowledges thatjudicial condemnation of state officers' failure to achieve
statutory objectives can actually constitute condemnation of the state entity
itself. In the Pennhurst case, the Pennsylvania legislature's failure to provide
adequate funding caused the individual Pennhurst defendants' failure to
provide adequate care for the institution's residents. 95 State policies, not any
87. Id. at 932-33.
88. Id. at 928-29, 939.
89. Id. at 928.
90. Id. at 942.
91. Id. at 921-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 229 (1965).
93. 104. S. Ct. at 911.
94. See id. at 915 n.25. At other points in the decision, however, Justice Powell embraces the fiction
of Ex Parte Young that "a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state official's action is not one
against the State." Id. at 909. Justice Powell's alternate acceptance and rejection of the fictions
underlying Ex Parte Young appear to be irreconcilable. See infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
95. 104 S. Ct. at 912.
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individual officer's failure to follow statutory instructions,96 caused the
injuries suffered by the plaintiffs. As Justice Powell concluded, if state law
was violated, it was a case of the state itself not fulfilling its legislative
promises.97
The Pennhurst opinion reveals the fictive nature of the Ex Parte Young
doctrine. The doctrine attempts to distinguish between suits challenging
state action and suits challenging state officers' official actions that are
unconstitutional or, at least before Pennhurst, ultra vires. As Justice Powell
notes, however, a state can act only through its officers. 98 Thus a suit
challenging the authorized activities of state officers is necessarily a suit
against the state itself.99
Abandoning the fictions of Ex Parte Young is a step toward producing a
coherent eleventh amendment doctrine. By pretending that prospective
injunctive relief awarded against state officials does not implicate state
immunities, courts disguise the underlying question of these cases: when
should the nondemocratic branch of the federal government impose four-
teenth amendment obligations upon states? °° Neither courts nor legis-
latures can easily answer the question of when a state's interest in con-
ducting its business without interference must fall to the federal judiciary's
obligation to protect federal rights. 101 However, courts can better resolve the
issue by explicitly acknowledging the competing interests of the state entity,
the federal courts, and the plaintiff, than by engaging in fictions. 102
96. Theoretically, as Justice Stevens argued, the individual Pennhurst defendants could be consid-
ered to have acted contrary to the objectives outlined in Pennsylvania's MHIMR Act, see supra note 65,
and therefore to have acted ultra vires. Generally, however, courts find that officials have acted outside
their statutory authority only when they in some manner have chosen to act outside the scope of their
office. See, e.g., Kozera v. Spirito, 723 F2d 1003,1008 (1st Cir. 1983) (sovereign immunity does not bar
claim that Secretary of Health and Human Services promulgated a regulation that violated federal
statute and constitution); Washington v. Udall, 417 E2d 1310, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1969) (sovereign
immunity does not bar claim that Secretary of the Interior imposed limits on delivery of irrigation water
without statutory authorization). It is difficult to argue that an officer has acted contrary to the state's
mandate when the state itself refuses to provide the funds necessary to comply with the statute. Cf.
William v. Bennett, 689 F2d 1370, 1387-89 (lth Cir. 1982) (even though state may not avoid injunction
ordering prison reform by claiming inadequate funds, individual officers may be allowed to escape
personal liability by proving they possessed inadequate resources to comply with mandates of constitu-
tion), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 335 (1983).
97. 104 S. Ct. at 912.
98. Id. at 915, .25.
99. See L. JAFE, supra note 92, at 200; Davis, supra note 1, at 435.
100. K. DAvis, ADMI sTRATIvE LAw TEXT § 27.02, at 498 (3d ed. 1972); L. JAFFE, supra note 92,
at 200; Baker, supra note 29, at 165.
101. For studies that identify and evaluate the interests at stake in an eleventh amendment
controversy, see L. JAFE, supra note 92, at 215-22; Baker, supra note 29, at 175-80;'Davis, supra note
1, at 27; and Lichenstein, Retroactive Relief in the Federal Courts Since Edelman v. Jordan: A Trip
Through the Twilight Zone, 32 CASE W. Ras. L. REv. 364 (1982).
102. As Professor Davis observed: "The forms do matter.. . . [F]alse pretenses cause much harm
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In Pennhurst, for example, abandoning the fictions of Ex Parte Young
allowed the Court to consider explicitly whether a state's failure to fund its
own legislative programs warranted a federal court's assertion of power over
state officials absent proof of violations of federal law. The question of
whether federal courts should rely on state law is difficult, especially when
a plaintiff seeks to effect institutional reform. 103 The majority candidly
assessed the tension between the states' interest in protecting their pol-
icymaking functions from federal court intrusion10 4 and the federal courts'
obligation to vindicate federal rights. 105 The Court also recognized that a
state forum is available for plaintiffs to pursue state law claims. 106 These
considerations support the majority's ultimate conclusion that state sov-
ereignty precludes assertion of federal jurisdiction over state officers'
official conduct when that conduct violates no federal law.
As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, the Court's decision does
disregard time-honored arguments. Reliance on state law allows federal
courts to avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudication and duplicative
litigation. 107 Reliance on state law also enhances the decisionmaking auton-
omy of the states. 10 8 As Justice Stevens also pointed out, the decision
overturns precedents that dictate that once a federal court has acquired
jurisdiction over state officers under Ex Parte Young, the court can and
should rule on pendent state-law claims. 109
even when no one is fooled by them." Davis, supra note 1, at 438. See also L. JAFFE, supra note 92, at
229; Baker, supra note 29, at 172-75.
103. The Pennhurst controversy reveals a conflict in two lines of federal court tradition. Supreme
Court decisions suggest that federal courts' power to impose institutional reforms on state or local
facilities is limited to redressing established constitutional violations. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of
Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 419-20 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281-83
(1977); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
Federal courts, however, prefer to rely on state law whenever possible. Reliance on state law avoids
decisions under the federal constitution; this doctrine is often called the "Ashwander doctrine" because
it was so clearly articulated in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring). See also Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman
Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071, 1097 n.96 (1974). Reliance on state law is also considered
a means to honor state sovereignty. Theoretically, a state may avoid completely a federal court ruling that
is based on state law by changing its law legislatively or by obtaining a state court ruling on the matter.
104. The Court identified three intrusive aspects of the court of appeals' affirmation of the trial
court's award: (1) subjecting a sovereign state to suit in the forum of the federal sovereign; (2) imposing a
substantial and ongoing financial burden on the state; and (3) imposing relief on the state that does not
vindicate federal law, but instead merely instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state
law. Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. at 907, 910, 911.
105. Id. at 910-11.
106. Id. at 919-20.
107. Id. at 939-42.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 939. The majority decision overrules at least three Supreme Court decisions. See Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909); see also Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v.
Greene, 244 U.S. 522 (1917); Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co., 244 U.S. 499 (1917).
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The majority's reasoning is persuasive, however, because of the Court's
acknowledgment that the court of appeals' award significantly affected the
sovereignty of Pennsylvania. In contrast, Justice Stevens' analysis refuses to
acknowledge that the award interfered with the state. 110 This refusal to
acknowledge reality robs his ultra vires argument of persuasiveness.
B. Two Steps Backward: A Jurisdictional Tangle
Even though the Pennhurst Court took a step forward by discarding the
fiction that suits to enjoin state officials' conduct do not affect state
sovereignty, the Court also created a jurisdictional tangle. As discussed
earlier, the use of fiction in eleventh amendment doctrine has allowed courts
to avoid resolving the issue of the nature of the eleventh amendment defense
and its relationship to the fourteenth amendment. 1 ' The Pennhurst Court
discarded a fiction of Ex Parte Young, but still failed to resolve this issue.
On one hand, the Court based its holding that the eleventh amendment bars
state law pendent jurisdiction claims on a characterization of the eleventh
amendment as a jurisdictional defense. 112 On the other hand, however, the
Court seemed to describe states' eleventh amendment immunity as a sub-
stantive defense that must be balanced against the federal courts' fourteenth
amendment obligation to vindicate federal rights." 3
Moreover, the Court's holding that the eleventh amendment is ajurisdic-
tional bar that cannot be overcome by the judge-made doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction 4 creates a dilemma. The Ex Parte Young doctrine is entirely
judge-made. 11 The Pennhurst Court acknowledged, however, that the use
of Ex Parte Young is necessary if federal courts are to satisfy their fourteenth
amendment obligation to vindicate federal rights. " 6 The Court failed to
explain how courts can use the Ex Parte Young doctrine, "17 which the Court
110. Even Justice Stevens admits that his ultra vires argument is.better supported by history than by
logic. Id. at 937 ("the distinction between the State and its officers, realistic or not, is one firmly
embedded in the doctrine of sovereign immunity.").
111. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
112. Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. at 919-20; see supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. Justice
Powell's opinion appears to adopt the theories of Professors Nowak and Tribe that article III creates
judicial power over controversies between states and private citizens, and that the eleventh amendment
constitutionally limits the judiciary, but not Congress. See Nowak, supra note 27 (courts possess limited
inherent power under the fourteenth amendment to impose prospective relief against states; Congress
possesses broader power); Tribe, supra note 27 (eleventh amendment does not equally limit Congress
and the judiciary).
113. 104 S. Ct. at 910-11 see supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
114. 104 S. Ct. at 919-20.
115. see supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
116. 104 S. Ct. at 910-11.
117. The Court did emphasize that the Ex Parte Young doctrine is "necessary to permit the federal
courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to 'the supreme authority of the
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acknowledged infringes upon state sovereignty,118 when the eleventh
amendment constitutionally bars federal court infringement of state sov-
ereignty.
The Court avoided the tangle it created by resorting to the fiction that it
scorned. At several points in the opinion, the Court invoked Ex Parte
Young's fiction that suits challenging the constitutionality of a state official's
conduct are not suits against the state itself. 119 Apparently, the Court's
rejection of this fiction is limited to state-law claims. 120
The Court should have discarded the doctrine of Ex Parte Young
altogether. Confusion and illogic will plague eleventh amendment doctrine
as long as courts hide the conflict between the eleventh and fourteenth
amendments behind fictions. Lower courts should follow the spirit of the
holdings of Pennhurst and completely abandon the fiction of Ex Parte
Young.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: SECTION 1983
JURISDICTION OVER STATES
The fictive doctrine of Ex Parte Young is not necessary to resolve the
conflict between the eleventh and fourteenth amendments. An alternative
means to justify federal court assertion of power over state officials is to rely
on section 1983121 as congressional authorization for federal courts to
United States."' Id. at 910. The pendent jurisdiction doctrine is also necessary, however, to enable
federal courts to provide an effective federal forum. See supra note 10.
Perhaps Justice Powell assumes that the fourteenth amendment or § 1983 authorizes use of the Ex
Parte Young doctrine. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
118. 104 S. Ct. at 915 n.25; see supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
119. Id. at 908-09, 919.
120. The issue addressed by the Court was limited to claims that state officials violated state law in
carrying out their official responsibilities. Id. at 911, 919.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). The statute provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
• . .subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States. . .to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
Id.
The provision, originally part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, was enacted to enforce the guarantees of
the fourteenth amendment by providing individuals a cause of action in federal court. See Act of April
20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat 13. At the time of the statute's enactment, the federal trial courts possessed
no general jurisdiction over cases arising under the federal constitution, laws, or treaties. I J. MOORE, J.
LUCAS, H. FINK, D. WECKSTEIN & J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.62, at 700.12 (2d ed.
1984) [hereinafter cited as MOORE]; see generally Developments in the Law, supra note 38, at 1135,
1153-56. The provision now exists in a remedial portion, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a jurisdictional
counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1982). 13B WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 3573, at 192-94 (2d ed.
1984); 1 MOORE, supra, 0.62. Today, a plaintiff who asserts a cause of action under § 1983 can also
rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), which provides federal district courts original jurisdiction over civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 13B WRIGHT, supra note 4,
§ 3573.2, at 207.
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fashion those remedies necessary to vindicate federal rights.122 Congress
may authorize causes of action that infringe on state immunity when acting
under the authority of the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.'2 3 Lower federal courts could rely on section 1983 as authority to
fashion remedies against states and their functional equivalents, state
officials acting in their representative capacity. This alternative allows
courts to abandon many of the fictions of ExParte Young. Moreover, courts
can abandon the fictions even while the Supreme Court struggles to charac-
terize the nature of the eleventh amendment.
The Pennhurst majority's characterization of the purposes of the Ex Parte
Young doctrine is strikingly similar to the Court's characterization of the
purposes of section 1983. The purpose of the Ex Parte Young doctrine,
according to the Pennhurst Court, is to enable the federal courts to fulfill
their obligation to promote federal rights and to hold state officials respon-
sible to the supreme authority of the United States. 124 This theme of state
officials' accountability for violations of federal rights is echoed in section
1983 doctrine. Even though section 1983 was enacted as the enabling
statute for the fourteenth amendment, the statute's remedy is not limited to
violations of that amendment. The statute instead provides a private cause
of action for the violation of any constitutional provision and any statutory
right' 2 for which Congress has not provided an alternative remedy. 126
A. Developing a Section 1983 Model
The Supreme Court has concluded that section 1983 does not completely
override states' immunity to suit. 127 The Court's decisions do not, however,
foreclose a two-tiered analysis (1) that section 1983 provides federal courts
122. A further means to justify federal court jurisdiction over state officials is to construe the
fourteenth amendment to limit the barrier of the eleventh amendment. See, e.g., Nowak, supra note 27
(despite the eleventh amendment, under the fourteenth amendment federal courts possess inherent
power to name states directly and order compliance with the fourteenth amendment). The Supreme
Court has refused to rule that the fourteenth amendment overrides the eleventh amendment. See supra
notes 39-40 and accompanying text. Until the Supreme Court rules that the fourteenth amendment
authorizes federal courts to act against states, federal courts are constrained to rely on congressional
authorization or the fictions of ExParte Young. Cf Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F.2d 1166, 1186-90 (5th Cir.
1978) (Goldberg, J.,with Brown, C.J., concurring) (concurring justices requested Supreme Court to
construe fourteenth amendment to empower federal courts to act against states).
123. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1976).
124. Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. at 910.
125. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (section 1983 remedy encompasses violations of
federal statutory as well as federal constitutional law).
126. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clanmers Ass'n., 453 U.S. 1, 21
(1981) (existence of express remedies in federal legislation reveals congressional intent to supplant
section 1983 remedy).
127. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction to fashion remedies against states, and (2) that the states'
sovereign immunity provides a limited defense to suits by private citizens.
The first tier of the proposed analysis requires that states be included
within the scope of section 1983. The ambit of section 1983 can extend to
states only if states qualify as "persons" for section 1983 purposes. 128 In
1961, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress did not intend to include
municipal corporations within the statute's definition of persons. 129 Subse-
quently, the Court ruled-without considering whether states are persons
for purposes of section 1983-that section 1983 does not abrogate states'
eleventh amendment immunity to money damages or retroactive monetary
relief. 130 In 1978, the Court reversed its earlier position and ruled that a
municipal corporation does qualify as a person within section 1983.131
Lower courts now disagree whether states are persons for purposes of
section 1983. Some lower courts interpret Supreme Court decisions to
exclude states from section 1983's ambit. 132 Other courts interpret the same
decisions to leave the question open, however, and include states within the
reach of section 1983.133 The latter interpretation is more consistent with
the Court's standards for defining "person" for purposes of section 1983.134
128. 13B WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 3573.1, at 198, 201-02 (2d ed. 1984).
129. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961).
130. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675-78 (1974).
131. Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
132. See, e.g., Croatan Books, Inc. v. Virginia, 574 F. Supp. 880, 883-84 (E.D. Va. 1983);
Kompara v. Board of Regents, 548 R Supp. 537, 542 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); see also 13 WRIGHT, supra
note 4, § 3524, at 176 n.98 & 180 n.109 (2d ed. 1984), and cases cited therein.
These courts generally rely on three Supreme Court decisions to support their rulings. First, in Monell
the Supreme Court limited its holding to "local government units which are not considered part of the
State for Eleventh Amendment purposes." 436 U.S. at 690 n.54. Second, in Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S.
781 (1978), the Court granted certiorari to determine "[w]hether the mandatory injunction issued
against the State of Alabama and the Alabama Board of Corrections violates the State's Eleventh
Amendment immunity or exceeds the jurisdiction granted federal courts by 42 U.S.C. § 1983," and
ruled that the State and Board had to be dismissed from the action. Id. at 782 & n.2. Finally, in Quem v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979), Justice Rehnquist relied in part on Alabama v. Pugh to reaffirm the
Edelman conclusion that § 1983 does not override states' traditional immunities. Id. at 338-46.
133. See, e.g., Gay Student Serv. v. Texas A & M University, 612 F.2d 160, 163-64 & n.3 (5th Cir.
1980); Harris v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 528 F Supp. 987, 991-92 (D. Ariz. 1981); Irwin v. Calhoun,
522 F. Supp. 576,583-84 (D. Mass. 1981); Marrapese v. Rhode Island, 500 F Supp. 1207, 1212 (D.R.I.
1982).
These decisions separate the issues of an entity's status under section 1983 and its status under the
eleventh amendment. The courts generally reason as follows: there is no analytical difference between
state agencies and the agency deemed a person for purposes of § 1983 in Monell. The Pugh decision to
dismiss a state and a state agency from a § 1983 suit was decided on eleventh amendment grounds and
did not address the scope of § 1983. Moreover, since the Pugh Court indicated that states can consent to
a § 1983 suit, 483 U.S. at 783, § 1983 jurisdiction over states must exist. In Quern, Justice Rehnquist
conspicuously avoided stating that the term "person" does not include "state," and explicitly stated that
the Court's decision does not "render § 1983 meaningless as far as States are concerned." 440 U.S. at
345 (citing Ex Parte Young).
134. Note, Amenability of States to Section 1983 Suits: Re-examining Quern v. Jordan, 62 B.U.L.
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The second tier of the proposed analysis encompasses states' defenses to
section 1983 liability. Even if the scope of section 1983 includes states, the
Supreme Court has held that states are immune to claims (1) for money
damages, 135 (2) for retroactive restitution, 136 (3) that name a state as a party
defendant, 137 and (4) that are based on state law. 138
Arguably, these decisions establish that states are completely immune to
section 1983 actions. 139 Under this analysis, the eleventh amendment bars
these claims against state officials because the claims are "really" against
the state, or run "directly" against the state. 140
Supreme Court decisions, however, reject the view that the eleventh
amendment renders section 1983 meaningless with regard to states. 141 The
Court has acknowledged that federal courts acting under section 1983 can
interfere with state functions to a limited extent. 142 Thus, a more precise
analysis of the Court's decisions is that the eleventh amendment simply
limits the remedial power of federal courts. 143 Edelman v. Jordan, 144 for
example, should be interpreted merely to hold that section 1983 did not
REV. 731, 754-59 (1982).
135. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
136. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974).
137. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781,782 (1978); see also infra notes 145-51 and accompanying
text.
138. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
139. See, e.g., Note, supra note 134, at 752-53 (Supreme Court cases suggest that states are
persons for purposes of § 1983, but § 1983 does not override states' eleventh amendment immunity
from suit in federal court).
140. In Pennhurst, for example, Justice Powell tried to distinguish between claims that run
"directly" against a state and claims that are permissible under the eleventh amendment. See 104 S. Ct.
at 912 n.17, 917.
141. See, e.g., Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,345 (1979) ("Nordoes ourreaffirmance ofEdelman
render § 1983 meaningless insofar as States are concerned.").
142. See Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. at 912 n.17 (in light of Civil War Amendments, an injunction based
on federal law is not barred by state sovereignty); id. at 915 n.25 (injunctive relief does run against a
state); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974) (citizen may sue a state under § 1983, but relief is
limited to prospective injunctive relief).
143. Courts would not contravene principles of § 1983 case law if they were to recognize states'
traditional immunities as limits to the scope of § 1983. Even though the text of § 1983 suggests that it is
not limited by any exceptions, see supra note 121, the Court has allowed traditional immunities to be
asserted as defenses by state legislative, executive, and judicial officials. See generally 13B WRIGHT,
supra note 4, § 3573.3, at 220--25 (2d ed. 1984).
The proposed two-tiered model is consistent with reasoning advanced by both Justices Powell and
Rehnquist. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 22 n.10 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Section 1983 action may be brought against States. . . [that] are protected against
retroactive damage awards by the Eleventh Amendment .. "); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,709
n.6 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (even if states are considered persons for
purposes of§ 1983, states should not lose their long-standing immunity to damages liability); Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,677 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.) (citizen may sue a state under § 1983, but award is
limited to prospective injunctive relief). Cf. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 702-03 (Brennan, J., concurring) (if
states are persons within § 1983, they may also be vulnerable to monetary liability).
144. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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override the states' traditional immunity to money awards in the circum-
stances of that case. The decision should not be interpreted to hold that
states are completely immune to federal courts' section 1983 authority.
B. A Limited Barrier to the Model
The Supreme Court's per curiam decision in Alabama v. Pugh145 presents
a limited barrier to the proposed analysis. In Pugh the Court held that a state
is immune from being named as a defendant in a section 1983 action. 146
Pugh therefore bars federal courts from using the proposed analysis to
entertain section 1983 claims against states that are actually named in the
parties' pleadings.
The immunity recognized in Pugh is a meaningless formality,
however.147 In Pugh, inmates of the state penitentiary system brought a
section 1983 action against the State of Alabama and various government
agencies and officials, seeking relief from allegedly unconstitutional con-
ditions. 148 The Supreme Court ordered that Alabama and the Alabama
Board of Corrections be dismissed from the action. 149 The Court otherwise
left intact the federal district court's order that the Alabama prison system
be reformed. 150 The message of Pugh is clear: federal courts cannot enter-
tain clams in which states are named as defendants, but they can control the
official conduct of state officers. A state cannot be sued in form. It can,
however, be sued in substance.
Despite the holding of Pugh, federal courts can use the proposed two-
tiered approach to abandon the use of the Ex Parte Young doctrine when
entertaining section 1983 suits against state officials. Pugh does not bar
federal courts from acknowledging that any section 1983 suit against a state
official for his or her officially sanctioned conduct is in substance a suit
against the state itself. 151 The proposed analysis can at least be used to
partialy eliminate the fictive doctrine of Ex Parte Young.
C. Applying the Model
The proposed two-tiered approach provides a means to preserve the
Court's step toward producing a coherent eleventh amendment doctrine. 152
145. 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
146. Id. at 782.
147. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Nothing . . . is acomplished by the summary action [the
Court] takes today.").
148. Pugh v. Locke, 406 . Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala., N.D. 1976).
149. 438 U.S. at 782.
150. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 92-110 and accompanying text.
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Section 1983 case law presents an excellent framework for analyzing state
immunities that are asserted as defenses to fourteenth amendment obliga-
tions. As the Court noted in City ofNewport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 153 when
a state official asks the Court to recognize a traditional immunity as a
defense to a section 1983 action, the Court considers the policies behind the
immunity and whether they are compatible with the policies of section
1983.154 Traditional immunities must be limited to the extent that they
interfere with section 1983 policies. 155
The Fact Concerts approach can be considered analogous to the
Pennhurst Court's observation that federal courts must accommodate states'
sovereign immunity and the federal courts' obligation to vindicate federal
law. 156 If the Fact Concerts analysis were applied to eleventh amendment
controversies, it would force courts to consider the competing interests of
states and federal courts. The analysis also would allow courts to dis-
tinguish precedent and impinge upon immunities explicitly if necessary to
vindicate federal rights. A court asked to award retroactive injunctive relief,
for example, could do so if necessary to implement federal law. 157 The court
would not be hindered by an analyis that a suit requesting retroactive relief
is a suit that is "really" against the state, nor would it have to characterize
the relief awarded as "ancillary" to a prospective injunctive relief order. 158
The proposed two-tiered approach also provides a means to explain the
irreconcilable aspects of the Pennhurst opinion. Construing section 1983 to
provide federal jurisdiction over states encompasses both the jurisdictional
and substantive aspects of eleventh amendment doctrine described by
Justice Powell.159 The jurisdictional bar that cannot be overridden by
judicial determinations of policy 60 is instead overridden by congressional
authorization under the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Courts must accommodate the section 1983 cause of action, however, to the
substantive sovereign immunity defenses noted by the Pennhurst Court. 161
153. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
154. Id. at 258-59.
155. Id.
156. See 104 S. Ct. at 910-11.
157. Cf Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 E2d 1166, 1186-90 (5th Cir. 1976) (Goldberg, J., with Brown,
C.J., concurring). InJagnandan, resident aliens challenged the constitutionality of a Mississippi statute
that required them to pay nonresident tuition at a state university and sought restitution of excess tuition
payments. The Fifth Circuit denied relief because of the eleventh amendment bar to retroactive money
damages recognized in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Jagnandan, 538 F.2d at 1179. Two
concurring justices noted that the Edelman rule frustrated the court's ability to effect the protections of
the fourteenth amendment, and requested the Supreme Court to reconsider the conclusion reached in
Edelman. Jagnandan, 538 F2d at 1188-90.
158. Cf supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
160. See Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. at 919-20.
161. Id. at 910-11.
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The proposed analysis may limit federal court power. If section 1983
provides the sole authority for federal courts to control state action, federal
courts will be unable to accept cases in which the exercise of federal
jurisdiction would serve federal interests other than the rights protected by
section 1983. In his dissenting opinion to Cory v. White, 162 for example,
Justice Powell advocated a construction of the eleventh amendment that
would permit a federal court to entertain an estate administrator's claim
brought under the Federal Interpleader Act. 163 Justice Powell argued that
the eleventh amendment should not bar actions that arise because of the
unique structure of the federal system.164
Justice Powell foreclosed his own argument, however, by stating in
Pennhurst that judicial determinations of convenience and fairness to
litigants cannot override the bar of the eleventh amendment. 165 The
Pennhurst analysis demands the conclusion that, without congressional
authorization, a federal court cannot assert jurisdiction over a suit that is
substantially against a state. Although the exercise of pendent jurisdiction
over state law claims is considered necessary for the effective functioning of
federal courts, 166 the Pennhurst Court held that as a judge-made doctrine it
is barred by the eleventh amendment. 167 That same reasoning must extend
to assertions of jurisdiction made for the purpose of providing litigants a
federal forum in which to litigate their claims in the absence of congres-
sional or constitutional authority to do so.
By substituting section 1983's congressional authorization of suits
against state officials acting in their official capacity for the fictions of Ex
Parte Young, federal courts can begin to clear up the tangles created by
Pennhurst. Federal courts can also begin to untangle eleventh amendment
doctrine, 168 and move toward carefully analyzing the interests at stake in an
eleventh amendment controversy.
Most importantly, by relying upon section 1983 instead of the fictions of
Ex Parte Young, federal courts will take a large step toward reducing the
uncertainty of the parameters of federal court jurisdiction. Eleventh amend-
ment doctrine is so unclear that predictability is impossible. 169 Litigants
162. 457 U.S. 85, 92-101 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
163. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1982).
164. Id. at 96. Justice Powell stated that "in a case such as this, in which the very controversy is the
result of our federal system, I continue to believe that resort to federal interpleader is not proscribed by
the Eleventh Amendment."
165. 104 S. Ct. at 919-20.
166. See supra note 10.
167. 104 S. Ct. at 919-20.
168. Construing § 1983 to provide congressional authorization of private suits against states
explains, for example, how states can waive their immunity and consent to federal court jurisdiction. Cf
supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
169. Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 683, 721
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availing themselves of the federal forum risk an expensive and unpredict-
able determination that their appeal for relief must be sought in state
courts. 170 The proposed analysis provides a means to reduce the uncertainty
regarding the federal courts' power to control state conduct.
V. CONCLUSION
It is tempting to discount Justice Powelrs novel formulation of the
eleventh amendment as a result-oriented decision to constitutionally bar
from the federal courts state-law claims against state officials. 171 The
Burger Court has distinguished itself with its attempts to divert local issues
to state courts and to preserve the federal courts for entertaining federal
matters. Construing the eleventh amendment to require that all state-law
claims be allocated to state court is perhaps merely a convenient means to
foreclose argument that some state-law claims against state officials do
belong in federal court. 172
Justice Powell's attempt to refocus eleventh amendment doctrine should
not, however, be discounted. Eleventh amendment doctrine is sorely in need
of reform. Much of the case law is inconsistent, and attempts by various
members of the divided Burger Court to develop a meaningful eleventh
amendment doctrine have created further confusion.
Justice Powell's attempt to describe a new approach to the eleventh
amendment doctrine reveals a willingness to brush away the fictions that
obfuscate the competing concerns of states, federal courts, and litigants.
(1981).
170. Id. at 723. ("Our failure to simplify federal jurisdictional rules has allowed them to become
essentially a bag of tricks, traps for the unwary, and huge hurdles even for the most wary litigants.").
171. Justice Powell has already revealed discomfort with the availability of state-law claims in
federal court. See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 24 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("there is
some evidence that § 1983 claims are already being appended to complaints solely for the purpose of
obtaining [attorneys'] fees [under 42 U.S.C. § 1988] in actions where 'civil rights' of any kind are at
best an afterthought."); Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 629
(1974) (Justice Powell's suggestion in dissent-that case be remanded for determination of state-law
claims against city officials-would misuse the constitutional decision-avoidance principles of Ash-
wander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
172. The Pennhurst majority could have achieved the same result without relying on the eleventh
amendment. Pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of right. United Mine workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). The Pennhurst Court could have ruled that use of pendent jurisdiction and
reliance upon the constitutional decision-avoidance principles of Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority are inappropriate when a private citizen is challenging the conduct of state officials. See, e.g.,
Mayorof Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605,629 (1974) (Ashunder standards
are susceptible to misuse).
State-law pendent jurisdiction enjoys a long tradition in the federal courts, however, and is usually
considered a doctrine of necessity. See supra note 10. The Pennhurst majority may well have believed
that a decision of constitutional dimensions was necessary to overcome the use of state-law pendent
jurisdiction against state officials.
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Federal courts should now begin working to eliminate the fictions that
remain. The Civil War Amendments are over a hundred years old. It is time
for federal courts to acknowledge that section 1983 authorizes and obligates
the federal judiciary to insure that the sovereign states do not deprive their
citizens of the rights guaranteed by the national sovereign.
Camille Gearhart
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